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Abstract
We analyze an oligopoly where public and private firms compete in quantity and R&D.
Using general functions, we show that an output subsidy and an R&D tax can achieve the
first-best allocation. Moreover, the degree of privatization does not influence the optimal
output subsidy but does influence the optimal R&D tax.
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1 Introduction
The relationship between subsidization and privatization has been discussed intensively in the
existing literature on mixed oligopolies. [9] showed that a uniform output subsidy yields the
first-best outcome from the viewpoint of welfare in mixed and private oligopolies. Subsequent
studies proved that his result is quite robust in various economic circumstances; [8] considered
the order of firms’ moves; [3] generalized firms’ objective functions; and [6] extended the model
of [9] to output regulation. These results are known as privatization neutrality theorem (PNT),
which claims that the first-best allocation should be achieved under an identical, uniform subsidy
to whatever extent a public firm is privatized.
The existing studies on subsidized mixed oligopolies have focused mainly on the eect of
output subsidies on production allocation. In particular, they have assumed that public and private
firms have a given identical production technology. However, R&D eorts could work to improve
firms’ technologies, thereby aecting production allocation. Inevitably, social benefits depend not
only on the production allocation but also on an allocation of firms’ R&D investments. As such,
adjusting the allocations of production and R&D is required to achieve the first-best outcome.
As a key to the adjustment of both allocations of production and R&D, we consider a policy
mix of output and R&D subsidies. Recently, some existing works have analyzed an impact of
subsidies in mixed oligopolies with R&D activities. [2] showed that the socially optimal R&D
subsidy increases total R&D and production, but it does not lead to an ecient distribution of
production costs. [4] showed that an R&D subsidy gives rise to higher (res. lower) welfare than
an output subsidy when the extent of R&D spillovers is high (res. low). However, these studies
focused only on a situation in which a single subsidy policy is employed. Instead, considering
both output and R&D subsidies, we examine how they aect the allocations of production and
R&D investments. In particular, we analyze whether the PNT holds in the presence of R&D
activities.
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2 Model
Consider an industry with (n + 1) firms producing a homogeneous good and engaging in cost-
reducing R&D investments. We define the set of firms by N = f0; 1; 2;    ; ng. Firm 0 is a public
firm and firm j 2 N n f0g is a private firm. Let P(Q) be the inverse demand function, where
Q =
Pn
i=0 qi is the total market output and qi is the output of firm i 2 N. Let C(qi; xi) and  (xi) be
the costs of production and R&D of firm i 2 N, respectively, where xi is the amount of R&D. We
use a bold character to represent a vector, such as q = (q0; q1;    ; qn) and x = (x0; x1;    ; xn).
Throughout the paper, the following is assumed:
Assumption 1. A finite number Q¯ > 0 exists such that P(Q) > 0 if Q < Q¯ and P(Q) = 0
otherwise. Moreover, P(Q) is twice continuously dierentiable with P0(Q) < 0 for Q < Q¯ and
"(Q)  P
00(Q)Q
P0(Q)
>  1:
Assumption 2. C(qi; xi) satisfies (a) (@=@qi)C(qi; xi) > 0 and (@2=@q2i )C(qi; xi) > 0, and (b)
(@=@xi)C(qi; xi)  0, (@2=@x2i )C(qi; xi)  0, and (@2=@xi@qi)C(qi; xi) < 0.
Assumption 3.  (xi) satisfies  0(xi) > 0 and  00(xi) > 0.
The government provides all the firms with two types of subsidies: an output subsidy and an
R&D subsidy. Let s = (sq; sx) denote a pair of output and R&D subsidy rates. The profit of firm
i 2 N is then given by
i(q; xi; s)  i(q; xi; sq)    (xi) + sxxi; where i(q; xi; sq)  P(Q)qi  C(qi; xi) + sqqi:
Welfare is
W(a)  w(a)  
nX
i=0
 (xi); where w(a) 
Z Q
0
P(z)dz  
nX
i=0
C(qi; xi) and a = (q; x) 2 R2(n+1)+ :
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Under Assumptions 1–3, the first-best allocation a f = (q f ; x f ) must satisfy the marginal-cost pric-
ing principle (@=@qi)W(a f ) = P(Q f )   (@=@qi)C(q f ; x f ) = 0 and the cost-minimization condition
(@=@xi)W(a f ) =  (@=@xi)C(q f ; x f )    0(x f ) = 0 for all i 2 N, where Q f = (n + 1)q f .
The government can sell its stocks of firm 0 to private investors. Let  2 [0; 1] denote the
private investors’ shareholdings in firm 0 (henceforth, the degree of privatization). We follow
[5] by assuming that each private firm maximizes its profit, whereas firm 0 maximizes a convex
combination of its profit and welfare, V(a; s; ) = (1   )W(a) + 0(q; x0; s), that is,
V(a; s; )  v(a; sq; )    (x0)   (1   )
nX
j=1
 (x j) + sxx0;
where v(a; sq; )  (1   )w(a) + 0(q; x0; sq):
We consider the following three-stage game. In the first stage, the government sets s = (sq; sx)
for a given . Observing the choice made by the government, all the firms simultaneously and
independently choose their R&D investments in the second stage and their outputs in the third
stage. We solve this game by backward induction. As easily confirmed, in the third stage of the
game, Assumptions 1 and 2 warrant the second-order conditions, the strategic substitutability, and
the stability of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
For the result presented in the next section, we define some functions. First, let the output
vector of the third-stage equilibrium be q(x; sq; ), which is characterized by the equation system
(@=@q0)v(q(x; sq; ); x; sq; ) = 0 and (@=@q j) j(q(x; sq; ); x j; sq) = 0 for any j 2 N n f0g, with
its Jacobian matrix 
 negative definite. Second, we denote the reduced forms of firms’ objective
functions by V˜(x; s; )  V(q(x; sq; ); x; s; ) and ˜ j(x; s; )   j(q(x; sq; ); x j; s) for j 2 N n
f0g. Finally, we denote the allocation and subsidy profile in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
by a() = (q(); x()) and s() = (sq (); sx ()), respectively.
3
3 Main theorem
We say that the PNT holds if and only if a() = a f and s0() = 0 (i.e., (s0q (); s0x ()) = (0; 0)).
The existing studies have shown that this theorem holds if R&D activities are not taken into
account. This can be expressed in our model as follows:
Proposition 1. q(x f ; seq; ) = q f , where seq   P0(Q f )q f > 0.
Proof: q f is the best response of firm 0 when the other firms choose q f . Indeed, it follows from
the definition of a f that
@
@q0
v(a f ; seq; ) = P(Q
f )   @
@q0
C(q f ; x f ) + P0(Q f )q f + seq = 
h
P0(Q f )q f + seq
i
= 0:
By the same procedure, we can easily show that q j = q f is the best response of firm j 2 N n f0g.
Q.E.D.
We finally examine whether the PNT holds if R&D activities are introduced. As indicated by
the following theorem, it never holds in the sense that the optimal R&D subsidy depends on 
even if the first-best allocation is achieved.
Theorem 1. Suppose that sq = seq > 0 and sx = sex()  nseq(@=@x0)q1(x f ; seq; ) < 0. There holds
a() = a f if and only if either (i)  = 1 or (ii) "(Q f ) = 	 holds, where
	    (n   1)(n + 1)P
0(Q f )
nP0(Q f )   (@2=@q20)C(q f ; x f )
 0; with equality if and only if n = 1:
Proof: First, we show that sex() < 0. Appendix shows that
@
@x0
q1(x
f ; seq; ) =  
1
det

h
P0(Q f ) + P00(Q f )q f
i "
P0(Q f )   @
2
@q21
C(q f ; x f )
#n 1
@2
@x0@q0
C(q f ; x f );
where det
 is the determinant of
. Since sign det
 = sign ( 1)n+1 holds because of its negative
definiteness, we obtain (@=@x0)q1(x
f ; seq; ) < 0 and thus, s
e
x() is negative.
4
We next show that x = x f can be the Nash equilibrium in the second stage under se() =
(seq; s
e
x()). First, we prove that x0 = x
f is firm 0’s best response to the R&D investments of the
other firms x 0 = (x f ;    ; x f ) 2 Rn+. By symmetry among private firms and the definition of a f ,
we obtain
@
@x0
V˜(x f ; se(); ) = 
"
nP0(Q f )q f
@
@x0
q1(x
f ; seq; ) + s
e
x()
#
= 0:
Coupled with this, Proposition 1 suggests that firm 0 chooses x f as the best response to x 0.
Similarly, for firm j 2 N n f0g, we obtain
@
@x j
˜ j(x f ; se(); ) = P0(Q f )q f
"
@
@x2
q0(x
f ; seq; )   n
 
@
@x0
q1(x
f ; seq; )
!
+ (n   1)
 
@
@x2
q1(x
f ; seq; )
!#
=
(1   )P0(Q f )q f
(n + 1)(det
)
"
"(Q f ) +
(n   1)(n + 1)P0(Q f )
nP0(Q f )   (@2=@q20)C(q f ; x f )
#
@2
@x0@q0
C(q f ; x f );
where
 = P0(Q f )
"
nP0(Q f )   @
2
@q20
C(q f ; x f )
# "
P0(Q f )   @
2
@q20
C(q f ; x f )
#n 2
, 0:
Thus, firm j chooses x j = x f as the best response if and only if either (i)  = 1 or (ii) "(Q f ) = 	.
Q.E.D.
Finally, we make several remarks on Theorem 1.
Remark 1. As stated by Theorem 1, output and R&D subsidies can yield the first-best allocation
even if firms’ strategic choices of R&D are taken into account. In particular, the first-best outcome
is obtained if demand is linear (i.e., "(Q) = 0) and n = 1. However, if demand is strictly convex
(i.e., "(Q) > 0) and firm 0 is not fully privatized (i.e.,  2 [0; 1)), the subsidies do not remove the
distortions enough to achieve the first-best allocation.
Remark 2. Using a mixed duopoly with linear demand and quadratic costs, [10] showed that if
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the government provides both production and R&D subsidies to firms, the optimal R&D subsidy
is negative irrespective of whether a public firm is fully privatized or fully nationalized. Theorem
1 extends [10] by (i) generalizing demand and costs, (ii) introducing partial privatization, and (iii)
allowing for more than one private firm. The negativity of the optimal R&D subsidy is explained
as follows. The production subsidy plays a role to reduce the distortion due to firms’ underproduc-
tion. On the other hand, it encourages private firms to overinvest because the greater investments
lead to the higher market shares. Thus, the government attempts to remedy the overinvestments
by imposing a R&D tax.
Remark 3. Some existing studies have presented the failure of the PNT by showing that subsi-
dies cannot achieve the first-best allocation ([1], [7]). By contrast, Theorem 1 suggests that while
the first-best allocation is achievable, the degree of privatization does influence the optimal R&D
subsidy. Indeed, the optimal R&D subsidy rate increases with the degree of privatization. We
briefly explain the intuition, relegating the proof to Appendix. An increase in  makes firm 0 pro-
duce less for a given R&D profile, which enlarges each private firm’s output because of strategic
substitution. Accordingly, private firms lose their incentives to conduct R&D investments and
thus, the government can raise the R&D subsidy rate.
Appendix
The derivation of derivatives
The optimality conditions in the third stage are given by (@=@q0)v(q(x; sq; ); x; sq; ) = 0 and
(@=@q j) j(q(x; sq; ); x j; sq) = 0 for j 2 N n 0. We dierentiate this equation system with respect
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to x0 to obtain


0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
(@=@x0)q0(x; sq; )
(@=@x0)q1(x; sq; )
:::
(@=@x0)qn(x; sq; )
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
=
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
(@2=@x0@q0)C(q0(x; sq; ); x0)
0
:::
0
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
: (1)
Recall that qi (x
f ; seq; ) = q
f for any i 2 N by Proposition 1. This implies that
(@2=@q2i )C(q

i (x
f ; seq; ); x
f ) = (@2=@q2j)C(q

j(x
f ; seq; ); x
f );
(@2=@xi@qi)C(qi (x
f ; seq; ); x
f ) = (@2=@x j@q j)C(qj(x
f ; seq; ); x
f );
for i; j 2 N and i , j. We then use F andG to represent (@2=@q2i )C(q f ; x f ) and (@2=@xi@qi)C(q f ; x f ),
respectively. Setting x = x f and s = seq and solving the equation system (1), we obtain
(det
)
@
@x0
q1(x
f ; seq; )
=

(1 + )P0(Q f ) + P00(Q f )q f   F G P0(Q f ) + P00(Q f )q f    P0(Q f ) + P00(Q f )q f
P0(Q f ) + P00(Q f )q f 0 P0(Q f ) + P00(Q f )q f    P0(Q f ) + P00(Q f )q f
P0(Q f ) + P00(Q f )q f 0 2P0(Q f ) + P00(Q f )q f   F    P0(Q f ) + P00(Q f )q f
:::
:::
:::
: : :
:::
P0(Q f ) + P00(Q f )q f 0 P0(Q f ) + P00(Q f )q f    2P0(Q f ) + P00(Q f )q f   F

=  
h
P0(Q f ) + P00(Q f )q f
i
G

1 1 1    1
0 P0(Q f )   F 0    0
0 0 P0(Q f )   F    0
:::
:::
:::
: : :
:::
0 0 0    P0(Q f )   F

=  
h
P0(Q f ) + P00(Q f )q f
i h
P0(Q f )   F
in 1
G
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Likewise, we find that
@
@x2
q0(x
f ; seq; ) =  
1
det

h
P0(Q f ) + P00(Q f )q f
i h
P0(Q f )   F
in 1
G;
@
@x2
q1(x
f ; seq; ) =  
1
det

h
P0(Q f ) + P00(Q f )q f
i h
P0(Q f )   F
i h
P0(Q f )   F
in 2
G:
Proof of se0x () > 0
Let us use H() to represent det
 under x = x f and sq = seq. Straightforward computation shows
that
H0() =

P0(Q f ) + P00(Q f )q f P00(Q f )q f P00(Q f )q f    P00(Q f )q f
P0(Q f ) + P00(Q f )q f 2P0(Q f ) + P00(Q f )q f   F P0(Q f ) + P00(Q f )q f    P0(Q f ) + P00(Q f )q f
P0(Q f ) + P00(Q f )q f P0(Q f ) + P00(Q f )q f 2P0(Q f ) + P00(Q f )q f   F    P0(Q f ) + P00(Q f )q f
:::
:::
:::
: : :
:::
P0(Q f ) + P00(Q f )q f P0(Q f ) + P00(Q f )q f P0(Q f ) + P00(Q f )q f    2P0(Q f ) + P00(Q f )q f   F

=
h
P0(Q f ) + P00(Q f )q f
i h
(n + 1)P0(Q f )   F
i h
P0(Q f )   F
in 1
;
which implies that signH0() = sign( 1)n+1 because of Assumptions 1 and 2. Thus, it follows
from G < 0 that
se0() =
nGseqH
0()
(det
)2
h
P0(Q f )   F
in 1 h
P0(Q f ) + P00(Q f )q f
i
> 0:
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